Lecture 12 Friday, 24 March 2023 bluetoth - very constrained devices I E E E d 0 2.11 / Wi-Fi - usually no Georgy constraints BT - today, BLE (Bhillooth VS) (earlier on, only than topology was supported) increuses e.g. robustress to interference différent layer orchitecture, some of which is closed source Physical/MAClayer IEEE 802.15.1 10 - 100 m FHSS with hopping frequency 1600 rersecond data rate 2 M f /5 3 Chamels for advertising, 37 data channels He rame chancel is not used for two consecutive transmissions PHY layer 2-3g lytes MAC layer ≤37 lytes packet size mode: Progetion Devely: authorized LE seure consistion pairing with conjustion De writy fundamentals everytin + authestication in BT much, always used

mardeday, or downgrading not allowed message offuscation trashean attack protection i.e. forward severy seure device provisioning Reparation of concerns BT was AES-CCM - fined MIC light not AES-CCM\*, which generalizes of AES-CCM 2alt 1 2 AES - CCM with give input **BLE Devices Addressing** • Public: Organization Unique Identifier (OUI) obtained by IEEE **Registration Authority** • Static: do not change until power-cycling the device Resolvable: can be used to derive the long-term address • Non-Resolvable: prevent tracking (recently attacked in BT 4.0) Public Static Non-resolvable Random Private Resolvable BT Rep network by shreddwing provisioning with allordes in rubnetwork device by should during provisioning between 2 modes application bey Unilar to Zighte joining BT network based on publish subscribe generic access profiles? five phases 1. beaconing New devices enit beacons leve: new devices enit, Lighte: enit after join BT's approach his lower duty cycle, likely more official lets provisioner understand what to do next 2a. provisioning invite sext 2b. rew device respons with previsioning capabilities 2. invitation We public be algorithm (weally hordwore-supported) to exchange shored by

two options: with/without available out of bad (000) channel (e.g. code on diplay, sound) 3. læchangingpublic bys 4. authentication Canbe done over OOB chamel, concludes with confirmation value check output OOB; select random number, output, and let wer input on other device referred over input OOB input ODB: input on unpreprisioned device, output on previsioner Static / no 00 B: generate random numbers, checked later Confirmation value check: checks whether bechanged materials were correctly should 5. provisioning data distribution retworkbey derice boy by indeze flags IV indez Unicast address AES-CCM used to greate notwork + device key IEFEDO2.11 bondwidth different 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz combone high data rates Channels interfere in blocks of 4! Chamel 14 used only in e.g. yeron Wireless hosts ad - for notworks do not have leternal connection infrostructure notworks do coordination function CSMA - CA Wi-Fi, time is anally slotted
but specifying message length may be necessary more number of bytes in payload: 2304 0 - 2304 address address address address seq CRC payload Address 4: used only in ad hoc mode Address 1: MAC address of wireless host or AP Address 3: MAC address to receive this frame of router interface to which AP is attached Address 2: MAC address of wireless host or AP transmitting this frame most I ot devices nowadays we WPA2. R SN security services authetication access control confidentiality with message integrity EAP = Extende authetication Protocol I E E E 802.11 i provides security between STA and AP
when the world to be a security only e.g. DTLS movides ed-to-end security (joining) Mayes Timilar to BT, but with authentication before by management PO2.12 controlled port remains blocked until boys ore received for transmitting data IEEE 802.1x Architecture • IEEE 802.1x defines three additional elements **Supplicant**, the client that wishes to perform authentication OAuthenticator, element that receives requests from supplicant, and proxies traffic to authentication server • Authentication Server (AS), element that oversees actual authentication of the supplicant. Could also reside together with the Authenticator. access control uses different pords uncontrolled port for traffic to authorized controlled port allows data only if authorized (if authorized if authorized) EAP Mases EAP over LAN RADIUS between AP&AS at end, posts still blocked; temporary bays should be generated Ugstding Beys, main thing to remember: pairwise bags includes temporal beys? 4- ways hardshake includes rorces, MAC, private temporal bey is a combination of different begs
for detecting Mit M important wed for group by hardstake WPA personal WPA entoyrise was MSK/AAA By Motested data transfer in WPA2 -> CCMP -> more complexe hordware provides Confidentiality + Integrity Connection termination used to teardown communication + restore communication to original state WPA2 improves on too-short beggs of WPA2 4- way hardshape replaced by Simultaneous authentication of equals (SAE) - exterior of drappy by exchange, modular outhmetic? forward secrecy WPA3 enterprise increased cryptagraphic robustness enhanced network resiliency to Unember BT player + order + scope

Wi-Fi Muses+order + nope

how to join Wi-Fi networks